This paper critically and selectively surveys the literature on protection for sale and discusses directions for future research in this area. It suggests that the standard approach need to be augmented to provide more compelling tests of this model. JEL Classi…cation: F13, D72, F17
Introduction
Over the past decades, the Grossman and Helpman (1994) Second, as is well understood now, the menu auctions model on which the PFS model is based, gives rise to a continuum of equilibria in general. What pins down the equilibrium is the assumption that bids are "locally truthful," a restriction which makes agents bid so as to be equally well o¤ whatever tari¤ is chosen by the government. However, the logic of this restriction in a static model in the absence of trembles that might make the government choose randomly, is not apparent.
Third, the key prediction of the PFS model has been depicted as "unintuitive." One would expect that unlike the model's prediction, protection is positively related to a change in import penetration. This is because industries where import penetration used to be low and has increased tend to be those where a comparative advantage existed but has been eroded and intuition suggests that in such industries, protectionist pressures are likely to be largest. This view is indeed consistent with …ndings by Tre ‡er (1993); regressing a measure of protection on the change in and the level of import penetration ratio (and other control variables), he found that the coe¢ cient on the former is positive and signi…cant, while the latter is insigni…cant.
Despite these concerns, the PFS model has had numerous empirical sup- Recently, researchers have extended the original PFS model by incorporating …rm size (Bombardini, 2004) , foreign and domestic lobbies (Gawande and Krishna, 2004), lobbying of both upstream and down stream producers (Gawande and Krishna, 2005) , and labor unions and labor immobility (Matschke and Sherlund, 2006) . While the original model accounts for tari¤s, its quota version was also constructed and estimated (Facchini et al., 2006) . These extensions, in e¤ect, graft some complications onto the original PFS model and provide evidence that additional factors are also essential. It should be stressed that as the extensions typically leave its basic predictions unchanged, they seem to provide more evidence in favor of the original PFS framework. This paper takes a critical look at past empirical work on the PFS model.
After presenting a simple and intuitive way of outlining further predictions of the PFS model, we discuss important issues in testing the PFS model. We mainly focus on the following points. First, we argue that the procedure of testing whether the signs of the estimated coe¢ cients are consistent with the PFS model is not a formal econometric test of the PFS hypothesis. This is because in most studies it is not clear what the alternative hypothesis is. Furthermore, even in studies that test the PFS model against an alternative, only the protection equation is tested, not the entire PFS model. Second, we argue that the way past literature classi…ed industries into politically organized and unorganized industries is not consistent with the PFS model and results in bias of the coe¢ cients of the protection equation. We then survey the recent papers that address those issues and explain potentially promising future research directions.
A Simple Exposition of the PFS Model
The exposition in this section relies heavily on Grossman and Helpman (1994) .
There is a continuum of individuals, each of in…nitesimal size. Each individual has preferences that are linear in the consumption of the numeraire good and are additively separable across all goods. As a result, there are no income e¤ects and no cross price e¤ects in demand which comes from equating marginal utility to own price. On the production side, there is perfect competition in a speci…c factor setting: each good is produced by a factor speci…c to the industry, k i in industry i, and a mobile factor, labor, L. Thus, each speci…c factor is the residual claimant in its industry. Some industries are politically organized, and being organized or not is exogenous to the model. Tari¤ revenue is redistributed to all agents in a lump sum manner. Owners of the speci…c factors in organized industries can make contributions to the government to try and in ‡uence policy if it is worth their while.
Government cares about both social welfare and contributions made to it and puts a relative weight of on social welfare. The timing of the game is as follows: …rst, lobbies simultaneously bid contribution functions that specify the contributions made contingent on the trade policy adopted (which determines domestic prices). The government then chooses what to do to maximize its own objective function. In this way, the government is the common agent all principals (organized lobbies) are trying to in ‡uence.
An easy way to explore the restrictions imposed by this setting is to break the problem into three parts. In the …rst part, ask what the cost is to a lobby, given the contribution schedules of all other lobbies, of getting a particular policy chosen by the government. In other words, if p is the outcome vector 1 (depicted as uni-dimensional in …gures below) what is the minimum amount a lobby has to pay to get a particular p chosen? 2 Call this cost C i (p). Once this cost is known, the second part consists of …nding the desired outcome for a lobby. This is found by maximizing the di¤erence between the lobby's welfarer as a function of p, W (p), and C i (p) derived in the …rst part. Finally, since the desired outcome could be attained by a continuum of di¤erent contribution functions on the part of this lobby (all that is needed is that the contribution be large enough to make the government do what is most desired by the lobby: its behavior at other prices is less tied down), the "locally truthful" restriction is imposed on contributions. This restriction ties down the equilibrium in a neat way as shown below.
Deriving Costs
The objective function of the government is denoted by G(p). It is made up of social welfare, W (p), (which has a weight given to it) plus the contributions or bribes the government receives from lobbies, P j J0
B j (p):
where the set J 0 consists of the sectors that are organized. Lobby group j in J 0 submits contribution schedule B j (p). Let
This is the objective function of the government when lobby group i does not enter the picture. Figure 1 depicts G i (p) which has a peak at p(i). If lobby i wants p chosen, all it has to o¤er is what the government would get if i was not in the picture! In this event, the government would choose p(i) and get
Thus, if lobby i o¤ered the government G i (p(i)) G i (p); it would be indi¤erent between p and p(i). Thus,
is the minimum that needs to be o¤ered to get p chosen. Note that as p(i)
would be chosen if i did not participate, the cost of having p(i) chosen by the government is zero, so C i (p(i)) = 0.
The Desired Outcome
Lobby group i has welfare W i (p). It wants to maximize its net welfare or
This maximum occurs at p m (i) as depicted in Figure 2 . Note that This in turn will a¤ect the equilibrium. It is for this reason that such games have a continuum of equilibria.
Choosing a Contribution Function
Suppose lobby i o¤ered contributions (subject to these being non negative) at p 6 = p m (i) so that it was as well o¤ as it is at p m (i). After all, at the "right price"
any outcome can be made desirable! In this manner, its contribution function keeps it "regret free", at least locally. In other words, it bids max(0;
where
) is a constant. Of course, B i (p) will lie weakly be-
. This contribution function can thus be thought of as W i (p) where it lies above A i (p m (i)) in Figure 2 . Note that near p m (i) contributions are positive, so that at least locally, the curvature of the equilibrium bid is the same as that of welfare.
Restricting lobbies to contributions that are "regret free", does two things.
First, it pins down these functions and gives a unique equilibrium. Second, it yields the useful property that the bids have the same curvature as welfare as is evident from equation (1). 3 In e¤ect, lobbies bid their welfare function less a constant! However, since government chooses p (the domestic price) to maximize the sum of weighted social welfare and total contributions, it in e¤ect maximizes the sum of weighted social welfare and the aggregate welfare of all organized sectors. In other words, the equilibrium outcome of this game is the p that maximizes
where the K j 's are constants. The equilibrium outcome, thus, is as if the government was maximizing the sum of welfare with greater weight placed on the welfare of organized industry groups. Consequently, equilibrium tari¤s in this relatively complicated setting can be characterized by performing a simple maximization exercise! However, the model has predictions, other than those on the equilibrium tari¤ levels, which are usually not incorporated into the estimation. For example, the contribution function in equilibrium keeps the government indi¤erent between the outcome in the absence of lobby i participating at all, and the equilibrium outcome,
Recall, W i (p(i)) + K i = 0; since i can get p(i) chosen by contributing nothing, 3 For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) .
so in equilibrium
so that
Hence, if the outcome is p(i) in the absence of lobby i 0 s participating, and
is p E or the equilibrium price vector when lobby i does participate, then lobby i pays the di¤erence in W (p) + P j J0;j6 =i W j (p) evaluated at these two points.
Thus, if lobbying by a group i results in distortions that result in a large loss 
Solving for Tari¤s
In the PFS model, the welfare of agents in industry j is
where j (p j ) is producer surplus in industry j; l j is labor employed in industry j; wage is unity, and Nj N = j is the fraction of agents who own the speci…c factor j, while T (p) + S(p) is the sum of tari¤ revenue and consumer surplus in the economy.
where ij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise, m 0 j (p j ) is the derivative of the demand for imports, and
Hence, maximizing G(p) with respect to p j gives
Let P i2J0 i = L and let P i2J0 ij = I j which is unity if j is organized and zero otherwise. Therefore, this equation can be reduced to
where P i2J0 i = L , assuming that agent own the speci…c factor of at most one sector, is the fraction of the population that owns the speci…c capital of organized industries, and where
If we further use the fact that (p j p j ) = (t j ) p j , equation (3) can be also expressed as
This is the basis of the key estimating equation:
where 
Data on Import Demand Elasticity
As equation (4) shows, estimation of the protection equation requires estimates of e j , the import demand elasticity. The elasticity estimates commonly used for US studies are those of Shiells et al. (1986) . The problem is that half the estimates are of the wrong sign or insigni…cant. They estimated import elasticity industry by industry by using OLS or 2SLS. Obviously, OLS is subject to endogeneity and measurement error bias. 2SLS as executed by them is problematic because the industry by industry sample size is very small and 2SLS
has potentially serious …nite sample bias. Furthermore, they controled for tar-i¤s in their elasticity estimation but not for the non-tari¤ barrier. Hence, if researchers use their estimates, the reverse causality from non-tari¤ barrier to the import elasticity, which could arise with aggregation in the industry data, cannot be controlled for. Another shortcoming of their estimates is that they are at the three digit level of aggregation. More disaggregated data need to be used for testing the PFS model, since testing political economy models, in particular, should be done at as disaggregated a level as possible. At the very least, more recent estimates, such as those of Kee et al. (2004) which are at the six digit level, should be used.
The Classi…cation of Industries
One of the key explanatory variables in equation (4) 
Some Testing Issues
The extent to which past studies did a stringent job of testing the PFS model is an open question. This results from the fact that most past studies did not formally test the PFS model. Past studies typically estimated equation (4) and examined whether the signs of the key coe¤cients (i.e., and ) follow the pattern predicted by the model. However, such an estimation exercise was typically conducted in the absence of a well-speci…ed alternative model. This problem was noticed by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) who mentioned that "(s)trictly speaking, we do not test the G-H model, because we do not have a well-speci…ed alternative hypothesis"(p.1135). Indeed, their concern is real; Imai et al. (2008a) recently showed that estimation of equation (4) is not enough to test the validity of the PFS model against alternatives such as a simple example model, which they call the "Surge Protection" model. 
Some Puzzling Results in Past Studies
As Table 1 shows, past studies typically found that political factors matter little; the weight on welfare relative to contribution, , is estimated to be very high (i.e., the relative weight on contribution is very low). However, given that contributions are small relative to their e¤ects on …rrm pro…ts and welfare, one would expect a reasonably high weight on contributions, because in the PFS model, equilibrium contributions by a group keep the government as well o¤ as in the absence of the lobby group, i.e., just compensate the government. 6 The estimated low weight on contributions could have a number of causes.
To begin with, data on contributions is not actually used in the estimation procedures of previous studies. The standard approach basically estimates equation The only paper we know that actually used contribution data directly is Kee et al. (2005) . They assumed that lobbies have a …rst mover advantage over government as is the norm in this literature, and looked at foreign lobbying in the US for preferential access (which reduces tari¤s to zero or leaves them unchanged) assuming world prices are given. 7 As a result, the welfare cost to the US is the loss of tari¤ revenue. This loss is, in essence, compared to the contributions received to obtain a weight on contributions relative to welfare.
Their results suggest that the government seems to value contributions …ve times more than welfare: a vast di¤erence from the results in the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) . 8 Second, it is possible that the relationship between the variables speci…ed in the PFS model is spurious and thus the supposedly low values for the weight on contribution obtained by past studies can be thought of as just a misinterpretation of the parameter estimates. This is the tack taken in Imai et al. (2008a) discussed in more detail below. They showed that a simpler model than the PFS framework yields similar estimated coe¢ cients, but without the strict PFS interpretation.
Third, it might, of course, be the case that the government does not need much compensation to keep it indi¤erent to the outcome in the absence of a particular lobby, or intuitively, that the supply of protection is very elastic at a low price. However, the PFS model is quite clear about the determinants of the equilibrium contribution level at a conceptual level. We argue below that it may be possible, given the tools we have these days, to actually compute the equilibrium campaign contributions given information of elasticities. 7 In their model, preferences are given if contributions compensate for this welfare loss. Contributions are o¤ered if the increase in pro…ts exceeds the full cost of obtaining them. In equilibrium, contributions leave the government as well o¤ as without lobbying. 8 Mitra et al. (2006) estimate the model assuming all sectors are organized. For reasonable numbers for the share of the population that is organized, they back out lower weights on welfare than come from the standard approach.
Recent Findings and Interpretations

A Model with Institutional Protection
Could it be that the data is actually coming from a slightly di¤erent setting than the PFS framework? If data generated from a simpler model than PFS can easily yield similar estimated coe¢ cients, then the strict PFS interpretation being put on the coe¢ cient estimates may be misplaced. This is the key idea with some random variation in the political organization probability across industries. This is done to ensure that there is su¢ cient variation in the numbers of subindustries that are politically organized within industries. 9 Industry is said to be politically organized if at least half the sub-industries are organized.
Output and prices of each industry are simulated with a uniform quota level Q for all subindustries. One way of interpreting this is that there is a trigger level of imports,Q; above which the relevant agency would restrict imports if asked, but only politically organized agencies ask for such protection. In other words, that there are provisions for preventing a surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use of these provisions perhaps because they can overcome the usual free rider problems. Subindustry output is aggregated to the industry level. The variables used in the estimation are then generated. The coverage ratio was calculated as the fraction of industry output i where quota is binding. The inverse import penetration ratio for industry i, z i , is the ratio of domestic production to imports.
The SP model is based on the followng observation about institutional settings. In the US for example, there are institutional channels with varying conditions under which an industry can ask for and obtain protection. Boltuck and Litan (1991) provided a description of the administration of such unfair trade laws that can result in protection. One such channel that is perceived as open to abuse today is anti-dumping. This is intended as a recourse for …rms subject to foreign competitors selling their product below "fair" or "normal"
price that causes injury to the domestic …rm. Practices such as pricing below full cost, which need not be anti-competitive, would then be subject to duties which could be quite high given the way such duties have been calculated in practice in the US. See for example, Blonigen (2006) . Although there are sunset clauses built into such duties, in practice, such duties can continue for quite a while. Safeguards are another example. Under WTO rules, safeguard actions allow a country to temporarily protect against all imports with the intention of allowing domestic industry time to adjust to import competition. Though injury has to be shown, it is easy to see that such institutional measures would allow protection more easily in times of stress, i.e., when foreign supply shifts out and imports surge. Moreover, it is also likely to be easier for organized
sectors to obtain such protection as it involves jumping through some hoops and because they can more easily overcome the usual free rider problems. 10 In such a setting, it might make sense to think of an institutional model such as above where government provides protection (and does so more easily for politically organized industries) when imports exceed a trigger level. If data generated for from the calibrated version of such a model is also consistent with the estimates in the literature, then we might want to look for deeper tests of the PFS model. If a setting where there are provisions for preventing a surge of imports, but only organized industries can actually make use of these provisions, is observationally equivalent to the data, this could explain the size of the estimates obtained!
The parameters of the model are chosen so that the simulation is reasonably close to the actual data in terms of the frequency of political organization, the share of NTB covered subindustries, the mean and standard deviation of the log of output to imports. The import demand elasticity is set at the mean of the industry import demand elasticity from the estimation of Shiells et al. (1986) .
They compare the simulation of the model to the data used in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) . The model matches the average political organization, NTB coverage ratio, log output/import ratio, and the standard error of log output import ratio reasonably closely.
They then simulate the model and run the standard regression on this data to …nd estimates that are close to those in Goldeberg and Maggi (1999) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)! This suggests the possibility that the crucial point is that organized sectors behave di¤erently from unorganized ones, not that the PFS model is valid. The results also suggest that estimation of equation (4) is not su¢ cient to conclude the validity of the PFS model against their simple model.
They argue that their results come from the following observation. In the SP model the protection measure is negatively correlated with the inverse import penetration ratio. This is because an increase in imports increases the probability that it will exceed the pre-set quota. Furthermore, the interaction term of the inverse import penetration ratio and the political organization dummy is positively correlated with the protection measure because only politically organized industries can have positive quota. These together roughly imply that the regression coe¢ cients of the inverse import penetration ration is positive and that of the interaction of the inverse import penetration ratio and the political organization dummy is negative. Furthermore, in IV estimation, for some range of parameters, the sum of those parameters become positive as well, hence satisfying all the conditions of the PFS hypothesis. Extending the SP model by allowing the quota to be stochastically determined gives results that are even closer to the actual data. In this case they …nd the coe¢ cients on the inverse import penetration ratio are zero at lower quantiles and decrease with quantile, which is consistent with the results of the actual data. Their results overall suggest that the qualitative feature of the SP model might be more consistent with the actual data than the PFS model.
An Alternative Test
The intuition behind the negative coe¢ cient estimate of the surge protection model is simple. A surge in imports, which increases the import penetration ratio, tends to result in the quota being binding, which corresponds to an increase in the NTB coverage ratio. Hence, the negative relationship between the inverse import penetration ratio and the NTB coverage ratio. involves comparisons of welfares of two di¤erent tari¤ policies. Since welfare is not observed, it has to be computed based on the model. Below, we discuss an algorithm that e¢ ciently computes the welfare given tari¤s. Then, we explain the required data to compute the welfare and roughly sketch the estimation procedure.
An Estimation Algorithm
We can get p E from the data. Recall that p(i) is the arg max of
Since the arg max of
1 1 A notable exception is Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) where they also estimated both the protection equation and the campaign contribution equation. However, the campaign contribution equation they estimated is a linear regression equation where the RHS variables are possible determinants of the campaign contributions, and does not tightly correspond to the menu auction equilibrium of the PFS model. is given by equation (3), it follows that the condition here should be such L is replaced by L i : Thus, we get:
This shows that knowledge of ; L ; i ; tari¤s, output, imports, and import elasticities substituted into equation (5) would su¢ ce to obtain p i (i) and thus the vector p(i): Note that equation (5) can also be solved to …nd the tari¤s that would have obtained had i not lobbied.
As shown earlier, the contribution levels themselves would be easy to estimate if we had the W j (p) functions. However, if we take a …rst order approximation we do not need the entire function, only its derivative. The equilibrium campaign contribution can be expressed as follows.
where 13 H i (p) = W (p) + P j J0;j6 =i W j (p). This says that equilibrium contributions are essentially the di¤erence in the value of the function H i (p) : R N ! R between p(i) and p E : Let p(t) be a path from p E to p(i) as t goes from zero to unity. Since the line integral is path independent, we can choose this path as desired. In particular, we can choose it so that p(t) = p E +t p(i) p E so that p(t = 0) = p E ; p(t = 1) = p(i); and Dp(t) = h p(i) p
Hence, 
